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TITLE IX- RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
I. THE PROBLEM: ORGANIZED CRIME'S PENETRATION OF
LEGITIMATE BUSINESS
Organized crime's penetration of legitimate business has long
been a major congressional concern. Although the means em-
ployed to effect such penetration may vary,1 the result remains
constant; organized crime is provided with additional economic
power and a facade of legitimacy behind which it can more easily
spread its influence and pursue its goals. At the same time, organ-
ized crime's monopolistic tendencies, furthered by its use of vari-
ous forms of coercion, pose a serious threat to free trade and
lawful ownership.
2
Prior law proved inadequate in curtailing these abuses. Federal
law was piecemeal and not designed to meet the challenge of
organized crime, and, consequently, much reliance had to be
placed upon ineffectual state laws. Moreover, difficulties of proof
made the successful prosecution of members of criminal syndi-
cates, especially those in the higher and more isolated echelons of
the organized crime structure, extremely difficult. More im-
portantly, however, conviction of any one member of a criminal
syndicate did not loosen organized crime's hold on legitimate
business. Rather, it resulted only in the adoption of a "com-
pulsory retirement and promotion system" in which other syndi-
cate members were promoted to take the place of the convicted
few.
1 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 190 (1967), cites four principal
methods by which organized crime gains control of legitimate business: (I) extortion; (2)
investment of profits acquired from gambling and other illegal activities; (3) acceptance of
interests in business as payment for the owner's gambling debts; (4) foreclosure on
usurious loans.
2 Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122,
and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 556 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings] (report of Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association):
Organized crime.., is a major threat to the proper functioning of the Ameri-
can economic system, which is grounded in freedom of decision. When
organized crime moves into a business, it customarily brings all the tech-
niques of violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal businesses. The
effect of competitive or monopoly power attained this way is even more
unwholesome than other monopolies because its position does not rest in
economic superiority.
3 S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
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11. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
In an effort to ameliorate these problems, title IX adopts a
three-fold approach. First, it attempts to prevent organized crime
from gaining control of legitimate businesses. Second, it seeks to
prevent organized crime from using legitimate businesses in
which it has an interest as a basis from which to spread its
influence. Finally, title IX attempts to facilitate the prosecution of
organized criminals by lowering the standard of proof traditionally
required by American law.
Section 1962 of title IX sets forth three major prohibited acti-
vities. It prohibits any person who has received any income from
either a pattern of racketeering activity, or the collection of an
unlawful debt, from using any part of that income to acquire an
interest in or to maintain any enterprise which affects interstate
commerce. 4 Title IX defines a "pattern of racketeering activity"
as at least two acts of racketeering activity. 5 The term "racketeer-
ing activity" is defined as: (1) any act or threat involving certain
crimes (including murder, arson, ano extortion) which are charge-
able under state law; (2) any act indictable under certain provi-
sions of title 18 (including bribery, extortionate credit transac-
tions, mail fraud) and title 29 (including restrictions on payments
and loans to labor organizations, and embezzlement from union
funds); or (3) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, securities
fraud, or dealing in narcotic drugs which is punishable under any
law of the United States. 6 The term "unlawful debt" means a debt
received from either gambling activity or usurious loans in viola-
tion of the laws of the United States. 7 The purpose of this provi-
sion is to prohibit organized crime from gaining a foothold in
legitimate business by using the proceeds of its illegal activities
for investment purposes.
Section 1962(b) prohibits anyone from acquiring or maintaining
any interest in a business through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or the collection of an unlawful debt. This provision differs
from section 1962(a) in that it does not require the use of income
from racketeering activity in the acquisition or maintenance of a
business. For example, foreclosing on a usurious loan is a means
4 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a) (Supp. 1971) expressly exempts from its proscription a pur-
chase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment if the purchaser lacks
intent to control or participate in the control of the issues and if the aggregate purchases do
not exceed one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class and do not confer
upon the purchaser the power to elect one or more directors.
5 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (Supp. 1971).
6 Id. § 1961(1).
7 Id. § 1961(6).
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frequently used by organized crime to acquire an interest in a
legitimate business.8 Although this would not entail use of the
income from unlawful debt and would not therefore fall within the
prohibitions of section 1962(a),9 it would fall within 1962(b). 10
Finally, section 1962(c)" 1 prohibits a person employed or asso-
ciated with an interstate business from conducting that business
through means of racketeering activity or the collection of unlaw-
ful debt. The purpose of this provision is to prevent organized
crime from using a legitimate business as a basis for conducting
racketeering activity.
12
III. Criminal Penalties and Civil Remedies
A. Criminal Penalties
The substantive provisions of title IX are enforced, in part, by
criminal penalties. Section 1963(a) imposes a fine of up to
twenty-five thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for not more
than twenty years for a violation of any of the substantive provi-
sions of title IX. Most importantly, however, section 1963(c)
provides that following the "conviction of a person under Title
IX,- the Attorney General may seize property or other interests
declared "forfeited" by the court.
The traditional forfeiture proceeding, frequently found in feder-
al statutes,' 3 is a proceeding in rem against the goods or other
property used by the defendant to pursue his illegal ends. The
origin of criminal forfeiture in English law is explained by Black-
stone as follows:
[Wihatever personal chattel is the immediate occasion of the
death of any reasonable creature [is forfeited to the
King].... It seems to have been originally designed, in the
blind days of popery, as an expiation for the souls of such as
were snatched away by sudden death.14
In J.W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States,' 5 the Supreme
8 
See note I supra.
918 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a) (Supp. 1971).
'ld. § 1962(b).
11 Id. § 1962(c).
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d) (Supp. 1971) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c).
13
See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1082 (1964) (relating to gambling ships), 18 U.S.C. § 492 (1964)
(counterfeiting), 49 U.S.C. §§ 78 1-83 (1964) (relating to narcotics violation). The Internal
Revenue Code has been a fruitful source of criminal forfeiture proceedings. In Un;ted
States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926), the claimant's automobile, used in the
distribution of illegal spirits, was declared forfeited by the lower court because of his
failure to purchase a liquor tax stamp.
14 I Blackstone Commentaries 300 (16th ed. 1825).
l5254 U.S. 505 (1921).
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Court acquiesced in the incorporation of this remedy into Ameri-
can law and held that criminal forfeiture "is too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced."- 6
B. Civil Remedies
Although the criminal penalties should have a deterrent effect
on organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business, title IX's
civil remedies should have the greatest impact.17 Under section
1964(a) the federal district courts are authorized to order any
person to divest himself of any interest in any enterprise, to enjoin
any person from engaging or investing in a business, or to dissolve
or reorganize any business. Further, section 1964(c) provides that
any person whose business is harmed because of violation of
section 1962 may sue the defendant for treble damages.
These civil remedies are patterned after those employed in
antitrust legislation18 and are included in title IX for two primary
reasons. The first is to prevent the monopolistic tendencies and
the other illegal activities which arise when organized crime en-
ters into legitimate business.1 9 There is little doubt that if vigor-
ously enforced these remedies, especially divestiture and treble
damages, will have a strong prophylactic effect on the expansion
of organized crime's hold on legitimate enterprise. Divestiture is
especially important in this respect, for it will ensure that organ-
ized crime's hold on a particular business will be completely
removed. Second, Congress apparently believed that title IX
would be more effective if someone other than the federal govern-
ment shared the burden of prosecuting organized crime. However,
in light of organized crime's notorious use of violence and other
more subtle means of coercion, it would not be surprising to find
the federal government alone in its prosecution under title IX.
To facilitate further both civil and criminal litigation under title
IX, section 1968 permits the use of the civil investigative demand.
Under that section, upon reasonable belief that any person or
enterprise may be in possession or control of "any documentary
evidence relevant to a racketeering investigation," the Attorney
General may order the production of such materials. 20
Delegation of investigatory powers, including the power of pro-
duction of documents, is not unique to title IX. Numerous federal
1s Id. at 511.
17 See Senate Hearings 407 (letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney
General of the United States).
18 See, e.g., treble damage provision of the antitrust acts. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
19 See note 2 supra.
20 18 U.S.C.A. § 1968(a) (Supp. 1971).
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officials have similar investigative grants to aid them in the per-
formance of their duties. 21 Indeed, the civil investigative demand
in title IX is very similar to that incorporated in the Antitrust
Civil Process Act. 22 The only significant difference is that the
antitrust civil investigative demand applies to any "corporation,
association, partnership, or other legal entity not a natural per-
son" (emphasis added).23 In Hyster v. United States2 4 the United
States Court of Appeals upheld the validity of antitrust civil
investigative demands and rejected the petitioner's argument that
the demand was an "unreasonable" search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.2 5 The court emphasized, how-
ever, that the demand was only enforceable pursuant to a judicial
proceeding. In such cases the court is given broad discretion to
protect the aggrieved party from any unreasonable demands. 2 6
The court in Hyster also upheld the delegation of such demand
authority to the Attorney General.2 7 The court cited various
instances of such proper delegation to "quasi-judicial" or adminis-
trative bodies,28 which have the power to refer evidence to the
Attorney General to prosecute for the commission of crimes
revealed during the course of their investigation. In the absence of
any showing that the Attorney General will abuse this power,
there is no reason why such power cannot be directly delegated to
him.2
9
A possible distinction between antitrust and title IX's civil
investigative demand, however, is that title IX's civil remedies are
based on a finding of guilt for the underlying "racketeering activi-
ty." '30 To prove a civil wrong, criminal liability must also be
21 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a, 1373, 1603 (1964) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to
examine books and documents upon a finding of reasonable belief); 26 U.S.C. § 7602
(1964) (authorizing Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to examine books, papers,
records and other data to ascertain correctness or completeness of any person's tax
returns); 33 U.S.C. §506 (1964) (authorizing the Secretary of the Army to inspect docu-
ments pursuant to the establishment of reasonable toll rates for bridges over navigable
waters); 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964) (authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to examine
documents and require attendance of witnesses pursuant to his investigatory powers).
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311- 14(1964).
23 Id. § 1311 l(f).
24 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964).
25 Id. at 186.
26 See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), affirming the denial of a
production demand pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act of September 26,
1914, Ch. 311, § 9, on grounds that the demand was too general and extensive and based
only on hearsay and suspicion.
27 338 F.2d at 186.
28 Id. at 186. See also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 186 (1950);
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, § 303 (1958).
29 338 F.2d at 186.
30 The difference between a civil investigative demand supplementing a primarily civil
antitrust statute on the one hand, and a criminal statute on the other may be an important
[VOL. 4:3
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demonstrated. This in turn gives rise to the problem of to what
extent information garnered for purposes of a civil suit may be
used in a subsequent or contemporaneous criminal action. This
problem has recently been obviated by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Kordel.3 1 That case involved the use of
evidence obtained from interrogatories during the course of a civil
libel action against a corporation under the Federal Food, Drug,,
and Cosmetic Act 3 2 in a subsequent criminal proceeding under
the Act against the corporation's officers. The defendants argued
that the use of this evidence violated their fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Although the Court found that the
defendants had waived this privilege, it did recognize that a timely
assertion of the fifth amendment right would be valid.
3 3
The rationale of the Kordel case should apply to title IX's civil
investigative demand. In both instances evidence derived from
proceedings attendant to a civil action may be used in a sub-
sequent criminal action. The fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination should apply equally to both cases.
distinction in light of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), in which the Supreme
Court held that " any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath or compelling the
production of his private books and papers to convict him of a crime or to forfeit his
property is contrary to the principle of free government." Id. at 63 1-32.
31 397 U.S. 1 (190).
32 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1964).
33 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). The Court did, however, emphasize that there was no con-
stitutional barrier to the Government's pursuing both a civil and criminal action: "It would
stultify enforcement of federal law to require a governmental agency ... invariably to
choose either to forego recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief,
or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a criminal trial." Id. at 11
(1970).
